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Abstract Policy monitoring is often seen as a crucial ingredient of policy evalua-
tion, but theoretically informed empirical analyses of real-world policy monitoring
practices are still rare. This paper addresses this gap by focusing on climate policy
monitoring in the European Union, which has a relatively stringent system of green-
house gas monitoring but a much less demanding approach to monitoring policies.
It explores how institutional settings, policy implementation, and the quality of in-
formation may impact the practices and politics of policy monitoring. Drawing on
quantitative regression models and qualitative interviews, it demonstrates that policy
monitoring has evolved over time and is itself subject to implementation pressures,
but also exhibits learning effects that improve its quality. In further developing both
everyday policy monitoring practices and academic understanding of them, there is
a need to pay attention to their design—specifically, the impact of any overarching
rules, the institutional support for implementation, and the criteria governing the
quality of the information they deliver. In short, policy monitoring should be treated
as a governance activity in its own right, raising many different design challenges.
Keywords Policy evaluation · Policy implementation · Climate change ·
Monitoring mechanism · European Union
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11615-019-00209-2) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
J. J. Schoenefeld () · K. Schulze
Darmstadt, Germany
E-Mail: schoenefeld@pg.tu-darmstadt.de
J. J. Schoenefeld · A. J. Jordan
Norwich, United Kingdom
M. Hildén
Helsinki, Finland
K
720 J. J. Schoenefeld et al.
Policy-Monitoring in der EU: Der Einfluss von Institutionen,
Implementation und Qualität
Zusammenfassung Obwohl Policy-Monitoring oft als ein wichtiger Beitrag zur
Policy-Evaluation verstanden wird, sind theoretisch fundierte empirische Analysen
bestehender Policy-Monitoringpraktiken noch immer eine Seltenheit. Dieser Beitrag
widmet sich dieser Forschungslücke und betrachtet dazu das weniger anspruchsvolle
und noch relativ junge Monitoring von Klimapolitiken in der Europäischen Union,
welches neben einem viel stringenteren System für die Überwachung der nationalen
Treibhausgasemissionen existiert. Die vorliegende Analyse beleuchtet insbesonde-
re, welchen Einfluss Institutionen, Implementation und Informationsqualität auf die
Praxis und die Politik des Policy-Monitorings haben. Quantitative Regressionsana-
lysen und qualitative Interviews zeigen, dass sich das Monitoring von Klimapolitik
im Laufe der Zeit institutionell verändert hat, selbst unter Implementationsdruck
steht, aber auch, dass Lerneffekte die Qualität des Policy-Monitorings verbessern.
Zur Weiterentwicklung von Policy-Monitoringpraktiken und ihrer wissenschaftli-
chen Erforschung sollte daher ein besonderes Augenmerk auf das Design von Policy-
Monitoringsystemen gelegt werden. Dazu gehören umfassende Regeln, institutionel-
le Unterstützung der Implementation und Kriterien der Informationsqualität. Kurz
gesagt, sollte Monitoring als eine eigenständige Governance-Aktivität verstanden
werden, die viele Herausforderungen an das Policy-Design stellt.
Schlüsselwörter Policy-Evaluation · Policy-Implementation · Klimawandel ·
Monitoring Mechanism · Europäische Union
1 Introduction
Many sources in the academic literature recognise “monitoring” as a crucial ingre-
dient of governance and, notably, policy evaluation (e.g., Aldy 2014; Dunn 2018;
Jensen 2007; Vedung 1997). This paper starts from the premise that the political dy-
namics, institutional questions, and, at times, technical issues that have often been
identified in other policy making stages such as agenda setting and policy formu-
lation, are also likely to unfold in relation to policy monitoring practices. It is thus
somewhat surprising that so few researchers have explored existing practices of pol-
icy monitoring in detail (Tosun 2012). Analysing them may have been neglected
because policy monitoring is typically portrayed as a rather mundane technical ac-
tivity. Hence, difficulties that are encountered in policy monitoring may not be fully
understood. Building on Carol Weiss’s famous argument, we assume that policy
monitoring is unlikely to be “[a] neutral, antiseptic, laboratory-type entit[y]” (Weiss
1993, p. 94–95). This paper breaks new ground by exploring the extent to which
policy monitoring can be subjected to the same types of political analysis that are
routinely applied to other areas of politics and policy making.
Policy monitoring can be an important ingredient of policy evaluation, which has
been defined as a broader set of approaches to “determining the merit or worth or
value of [public policy]; or the product of that process” (Scriven 1981, p. 53). Ac-
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cording to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
policy monitoring may be understood as “a continuous process of collecting and an-
alyzing data to compare how well a project, program, or policy is being implemented
against expected results” (OECD-DAC 2002, p. 30). While Vedung (1997, chap. 9)
argues that policy monitoring mainly focuses on the implementation process, leading
from an intervention theory to data collection and assessment, we follow Rossi et al.
(2018, chaps. 4 and 5), who distinguish between process and outcome monitoring.
In line with the focus of this special issue (Stephenson et al. 2019), we concentrate
on the European Union’s (EU) deeply institutionalised efforts to monitor climate
policies in its member states. In this area of policy, process monitoring may, for
example, centre on whether subsidies for renewable energies have been paid out and
how, whereas outcome monitoring would refer to assessing whether efforts to ex-
pand renewable energy have actually reduced greenhouse gas emissions. This paper
concentrates on outcome monitoring, which is normally conducted with the help of
indicators in order to understand the effect of public policies.
In the area of climate change policy, scholars have highlighted the need for
policy monitoring in order to ensure effectiveness and transparency (e.g., Aldy
2018), but emerging studies have also unpacked some of the challenges that emerge
in policy monitoring practice—many of them, such as variations in data quality or
power struggles between policy monitoring actors, often being linked to politics
and institutions (Niederberger and Kimble 2011; Schoenefeld and Jordan 2017;
Schoenefeld et al. 2018). More conceptual analyses have explored the extent to
which policy monitoring includes (or should include) processes of data collection
and/or data analysis (see Schoenefeld and Rayner 2019). Today, policy monitoring
is often conducted within—but increasingly also beyond—nation states in order to
achieve international/supranational goals, such as enforcing international agreements
(see Schoenefeld and Jordan 2017) or ensuring the implementation of EU policies
(Tosun 2012; Verdun and Zeitlin 2018).
It has been suggested that policy monitoring should be based on unambiguous
procedures and variables that allow policy comparisons across countries and tracking
over time (Öko-Institut et al. 2012). The EU has developed its legal base of climate
monitoring through political negotiations and by providing guidance to member
states in order to systematise common practices. It first created a monitoring mech-
anism for national-level greenhouse gas emissions with a view to reporting them
to the institution of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) in 1992 (Bodansky 1993; Hildén et al. 2014; Hyvarinen 1999). The
monitoring has since been extended to include requirements on monitoring climate
public policies in specific policy areas (Schoenefeld et al. 2018).
We focus on the monitoring of what the United Nations (UN) and EU refer to
as the “policies and measures” that member states have or expect to put in place in
order to achieve emission reductions (“policy monitoring”).1 Due to its central role
1 Article 3 (14) of Regulation (EU) No. 525/2013 simply states that “‘policies and measures’ means all
instruments which aim to implement commitments under Article 4 (2) (a) and (b) of the UNFCCC, which
may include those that do not have the limitation and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as a primary
objective.”
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in EU climate governance, the monitoring mechanism (EU Regulation 525/2013)2
is a suitable case to start exploring the dynamics of policy monitoring in more
detail. As Schoenefeld and Rayner (2019) explain, compared to the long-standing
practice of monitoring greenhouse gases at the national level, monitoring public
policies generated new challenges, starting with the difficulty of assigning emissions
reductions to individual policies in complex and widely interconnected governance
systems. The harmonisation of policy monitoring practice and ensuring sufficient
levels of quality were also demanding, highlighting the importance of institutional
complexity and multilevel dynamics.
In this paper, we examine to what extent an analysis of institutional settings, policy
implementation and quality of policy monitoring can help us understand member
state policy monitoring practice in the context of mandatory reporting to the EU
institutions. Our approach is novel in the way it combines several separate bodies of
literature. We explore the impact of the institutional settings, policy implementation
and quality in order to better understand the underlying patterns and drivers of policy
monitoring. To do so, we triangulate different methods, including document and
exploratory quantitative analysis, as well as qualitative key informant interviews with
four staff members of the European Environment Agency (EEA), which manages the
monitoring mechanism. The final section synthesises our findings, provides insights
for practitioners, and concludes with an assessment of future research needs.
2 The Monitoring Mechanism and its Outputs
Modern-day greenhouse gas and climate policy monitoring centres on a UN frame-
work based on internationally agreed monitoring standards developed by the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC; see Eggleston et al. 2006). Histor-
ically, a focus on monitoring and its use to evaluate policies was not the preferred
policy outcome for many EU countries as they prepared for the foundational 1992
Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit, which established the UNFCCC. On the contrary, it
was only because EU countries could not agree on substantive climate policies that
they opted to focus on monitoring instead (Haigh 1996). Monitoring was perceived
to be more technical and thus politically more tractable to progress in a difficult
diplomatic environment (see Bodansky 1993, p. 451). What has since emerged in
the EU is a relatively stringent system of greenhouse gas monitoring along with
a much less demanding and still emerging approach to monitoring of public poli-
cies, which countries started putting in place in order to reduce emissions—together
known as the monitoring mechanism (Hyvarinen 1999). The EU has revised its mon-
itoring mechanism several times—by and large in order to comply with international
agreements. In 2013 (see EU Regulation No. 525/2013) more detailed reporting re-
quirements were introduced, especially on policies and measures (Schoenefeld et al.
2018). The EEA compiles the policy monitoring data from the member states, checks
their quality, and then submits them to the European Commission, the EU’s main ex-
2 The Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) EU 525/2013 will be replaced by the Energy Union
Governance Regulation (EU 2018/1999) from 2021, but all elements of the MMR have been carried over.
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Fig. 1 Schematic of climate policy reporting in the European Union and the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change. European Union and United Nations monitoring and reporting occur in
parallel and interact. The stars in the corners of the boxes indicate the EU process
ecutive body. The Commission uses the data in EU-wide reporting to the UNFCCC
in accordance with international reporting guidelines. The member states also report
the details of their individual policies and measures directly to the UNFCCC. Fig. 1
outlines the institutional actors involved in the climate policy monitoring, as well as
the relationships between them.
The monitoring mechanism has centred on reporting ex ante (i.e., forward-look-
ing) predictions of policy impact, whereas ex post (i.e., retrospective) reporting is
optional since the mandatory national greenhouse gas inventories provide infor-
mation on overall climate policy success. This means that the EEA Policies and
Measures Database3 contains much more information on ex ante projections than on
ex post policy-specific data (Schoenefeld et al. 2018). In addition, the policy-based
data emerging from the mechanism since the late 2000s contain considerable incon-
sistencies. For example, the number of policies and measures reported has fluctuated
widely, and the plausibility of some past or projected greenhouse gas reductions has
been questioned (AEA et al. 2009; ETC and ACC 2012; European Environment
Agency 2016; Farmer 2012; Hildén et al. 2014; Öko-Institut et al. 2012; Schoene-
feld et al. 2018). These issues still remain, even though a quality assurance and
control regimen was created in the mid-2000s to improve the quality of submissions
(Schoenefeld et al. 2018).
Our analysis uses official policy monitoring data submitted by the EU member
states across all climate policies and measures, and thus all relevant policy sectors
(such as energy and transport) as well as instrument types (such as regulatory and
information-based).4 We consider only policies outside the EU Emissions Trading
3 http://pam.apps.eea.europa.eu.
4 Because the monitoring mechanism data includes more fine-grained data (such as qualitative, country-
based reports) that could not be considered here for space reasons, the discussion section contains a range
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Fig. 2 Number of climate policies and measures reported in the monitoring mechanism (European Union
Emissions Trading System excluded)
System (ETS) because the ETS is an EU-wide, quantity-based policy instrument,
which effectively prescribes the reductions at the EU level. Fig. 2 shows that the
grand total of climate policies (outside the ETS) reported each year is now around
1500 across all member states. The shading of the bars indicates the proportion of
climate policies for which the member states provided quantitative projected emis-
sions reductions relative to a counterfactual. Thus, the projection can be a positive
number (i.e., emissions decreases), zero, or a negative number (i.e., emissions in-
creases). The proportion of quantitative reporting increased steadily to about half
in 2013 but dropped significantly in 2015 and has since continued at a lower (but
again growing) rate.
Fig. 3, in turn, presents the same information for the individual member states.
Notably, there is significant variance within and across member states, suggesting
some implementation issues. Some of this variation may originate from the unclear
definition of what a climate policy actually is (see Footnote 1 above). For instance,
Finland has quantified an increasing share of their climate policies, while the Nether-
lands has recently reported additional policies without estimates of their emission
reductions. Others, such as Poland, have not reported any quantified data except for
of suggestions for further research. Going forward, we therefore use the total number of policies as well
as the number of policies with ex ante projections of emissions reductions for 2020 that the monitoring
mechanism generated in 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017. Member states are legally obliged to report on
climate change policies every other year. Earlier quantitative data are not available.
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Fig. 3 Number of policies with and without quantified projected emissions reductions by member state
2011. In order to better understand this variance, the following section turns to three
theoretical/conceptual approaches.
3 Understanding Policy Monitoring: the Impact of Institutions,
Implementation, and Quality
This section unpacks three perspectives on policy monitoring, namely institutions,
policy implementation, and quality, with a view to identifying patterns in ex ante
policy monitoring practices. While the three perspectives have emerged from differ-
ent literatures, this section demonstrates that they all hold considerable explanatory
potential in the area of policy monitoring. This section reviews extant knowledge in
each area, linking where appropriate with literature on reporting and policy evalua-
tion.
3.1 Institutions
Policy monitoring typically takes place in specific institutional settings, often in-
volving numerous actors, which may spread across different governance levels. It
fits the description of March and Olsen (2009, p. 3), who note that “an institution is
a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in struc-
tures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover
of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expecta-
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tions of individuals and changing external circumstances.” From this perspective,
it becomes important to understand to what extent the aforementioned “rules and
organised practices” impact on policy monitoring systems, both in terms of provid-
ing stability but also allowing a certain amount of change over time. The tension
between stability and change has long been noted in relevant literature, with Lindner
(2003, p. 913) defining institutional change as “the introduction of new rules or rule
interpretations that supplement or replace existing rules and interpretations.” It is
thus relevant to uncover to what extent the variations among member state policy
monitoring may originate from institutional differences and how rule changes impact
policy monitoring practice. Doing so involves paying close attention to the legal and
institutional features of the monitoring mechanism, such as relevant experience in
the member states, as well as the evolution of such elements over time.
3.2 Implementation
Policy monitoring is often conceptualised as a means to improve implementation.
However, policy monitoring systems, in and of themselves, are not necessarily self-
implementing. Studies on environmental policy in the EU have highlighted several
critical political aspects of policy implementation, especially related to the trans-
position of EU directives into national law (see Jordan and Tosun 2013; Knill and
Liefferink 2007). Important factors in transposition (and, to a certain degree, also
in the formulation of regulations) related to member states’ willingness to comply
include party politics, institutional goodness of fit (or misfit), public opinion, and the
presence or absence of interest groups. By contrast, states’ capacity to comply may
be influenced by the number of veto players as well as administrative capacity (Treib
2014). More recent literature has also pointed to the important role of EU agencies
in implementation (Thomann and Sager 2017). However, two shortcomings of this
literature are that it has mainly focused on the transposition of EU directives (with
a general neglect of the application of EU regulations), and it has also understood
policy monitoring as an enforcement tool rather than another site of implementation
(Treib 2014). The implementation of the monitoring mechanism may thus depend on
its legal base as well as its specific institutional setting. We also expect that learning
effects may generate improvements over time, in terms of both quantification and
timely reporting, especially because climate policy monitoring requires both signif-
icant technical and administrative expertise and experience. The overall number of
policies and measures with quantified emissions reductions may be related to the
total number of reported policies (i.e., with and without quantifications).
3.3 Quality
Policy monitoring may have different levels of quality. Schwartz and Mayne (2005,
p. 1) argue that while “there is now a large supply of evaluative information in the
forms of evaluation, performance reporting and performance auditing, relatively lit-
tle attention has been paid to assuring the quality of this information.” This may be in
part because, as Stake and Schwandt (2006, p. 405) explain, “quality is multifaceted,
contested, and never fully representable” (see also Dahler-Larsen 2019). Also, much
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of the debate on quality has centred on policy evaluation rather than on monitor-
ing. The concept of “quality” has both technical (e.g., needs are met) and cultural
dimensions; that is, it has different meanings in different societies (Williams 2005).
The quality of policy monitoring data also relates to its relevance for the policy at
hand.5
What quality is (and for whom) will likely remain contested because it is inti-
mately linked with various potential purposes of policy monitoring and evaluation,
including accountability and learning functions, as well as politics (Schoenefeld
and Jordan 2019; Schwartz and Mayne 2005). A policy monitoring system may
originally be designed for checking policy goal attainment, but once the system
starts producing information, this information may be used in many different ways.
Therefore, one should pay attention to actors and groups, which may pursue differ-
ent purposes and have linked interests (such as the EEA, the Commission, and the
member states in the current case). Other debates on quality have centred on the
nature of policy monitoring/evaluation methods (van Voorst and Mastenbroek 2019)
as well as on standards—the latter a discussion and effort that has been around
since at least the 1970s (Widmer 2004, 2012). These debates have been echoed by
discussions on the quality of climate policy monitoring data (see Wettestad 2007)
and concrete efforts to improve (e.g., Öko-Institut et al. 2012). In this paper, we
follow what Dahler-Larsen terms “fixation” through quantification as one indicator
of quality (2019, p. 142–147). Following this line of reasoning, aspects of quality
may be reflected in the effort that countries put into policy monitoring, such as to
what extent they seek to quantify policy effects, or the level of resources they invest
monitoring policy results. Furthermore, we consider “temporalization”—that is, the
timeliness of reporting—as an additional indicator of quality (Dahler-Larsen 2019,
p. 139–142).
4 Understanding the Monitoring Mechanism Outputs
4.1 Quantitative Analysis
We carried out exploratory quantitative analyses with a view to identifying potential
drivers of policy monitoring, drawing on the three perspectives discussed above.
We started by regressing the number of climate policies and measures for which
member states reported quantified emissions reductions (projections for the year
2020) in 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017 on a series of plausible drivers of
policy monitoring practice derived from the literature. We interpret the generation of
quantified emissions reductions for individual policies instead of a general aggregate
or loose qualitative statements as a sign of serious commitment to policy monitoring
and to the implementation of the monitoring decision/regulation.6 Moreover, we
compiled data on the punctuality of reporting under the monitoring mechanism, our
5 We owe this point to one of our reviewers.
6 Our dependent variable includes only policies with projected reductions outside the EU Emissions Trad-
ing System.
K
728 J. J. Schoenefeld et al.
second dependent variable. Member states must report on their climate policies by
15 March every other year, and we categorised countries that delivered their report
in the month of March as on time, thus allowing for insignificant administrative
delays (for the full data, see Table 4 in the online Appendix). Reporting punctuality
can be seen as a crude proxy for the implementation of policy monitoring because
states that fail to provide information on time probably face difficulties in organising
the policy monitoring and/or lack resources for the task.
Our independent variables (i.e., drivers of policy monitoring) were chosen based
on the review in Sect. 3 to reflect variation in institutional settings, policy implemen-
tation, and efforts to deliver high-quality policy monitoring. To capture institutional
effects, we included a variable indicating previous experience with monitoring and
evaluating national climate change policies (none, some, or extensive experience)
based on data from a European Commission-funded report on quantifying the emis-
sions effects of policies and measures (AEA et al. 2009). A dummy variable indicates
the legislative shift from the Monitoring Mechanism Decision (MMD: 2004–2012)
to the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR: 2013–2019). We expect that the
number of policies with quantifications initially decreased with the introduction of
the MMR (all else being equal), since it explicitly allows bundling of policy instru-
ments that achieve their effects in combination. We model learning effects through
a “trend” variable increasing linearly with each obligatory round of climate change
policy reporting from 2009 until 2017. In terms of the capacity to comply with
policy monitoring requirements, the regression models include governmental final
consumption expenditures as a proxy for the national bureaucracy’s financial capa-
bilities and a measure of political constraints (the expectation being that the more
constraints, the less reporting). In terms of willingness to comply we further con-
sider the seat share of green parties and the degree of climate change concern among
the national population (both expected to increase quantitative reporting). Finally,
we control for per capita CO2 emissions of each country, its gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) per capita, and population size. All time-varying variables were entered
with a 1-year lag because most data collection and preparatory work takes place in
the year prior to submission. We estimated negative binomial regression models for
the number of reported policies and measures with quantified emissions reductions
and logit models for the punctuality of reporting. Because our observations within
countries are not independent, we used standard errors adjusted for clustering within
countries. Table 1 summarises our data, its sources, and the operationalisation of
our variables.
Our first regression models (see Table 2) consider potential determinants of the
number of policies with quantified, projected emissions reductions (for 2020). They
reveal that the number of policies with quantified projections increases with the
overall number of reported policies. More precisely, for every additional climate
policy reported, the number of quantifications increases by 1.3; or almost 50%
for a standard deviation increase in the number of reported policies. Put simply, if
a country reports more climate policies, it also quantifies more compared to countries
that report fewer policies and correspondingly generate fewer quantifications.
Second, greater experience with policy monitoring and evaluation in 2009 has
translated into greater levels of reporting across our observation years, pointing to
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Table 1 Summary statistics and data sources
Variable Description N Mean SD Min. Max. Source
Number
of climate
policies with
reduction
projections
Number of reported policies
and measures with quanti-
tative estimates of emission
reductions
135 21.63 19.05 0 131 EU MM
Number
of climate
policies (all)
Number of all reported
policies and measures
135 52.25 31.24 5 200 EU MM
Report on
time
First report submitted to the
EEA within March
117 0.63 0.48 0 1 EU MM
Policy evalu-
ation experi-
ence
Previous experience with
ex post evaluation of cli-
mate change policies (as of
2009): none (0), some poli-
cies (1), comprehensive (2)
140 0.82 0.81 0 2 AEA et
al. 2009
Monitoring
Mechanism
Regulation
Monitoring Mechanism
Regulation
140 0.40 0.49 0 1 Own
Reporting
trend
Count of reporting rounds,
2009–2017
140 3.00 1.42 1 5 EU MM
Government
expenditure
State expenditures as a per-
centage of GDP
140 19.97 2.98 12.38 27.37 WDI
Political
constraints
Number of independent
branches of government
with veto power and the
distribution of preferences
across and within those
branches
140 0.48 0.10 0.18 0.71 Henisz
(2000)
Green seats Seat share of green parties
in parliament
140 2.54 3.82 0 13.10 Armin-
geon
et al.
(2018)
Climate
concern
Perceived seriousness of the
climate change problem,
not at all serious (1) to
extremely serious (10)
138 7.46 0.64 5.65 9.40 Euro-
baro-
meter
CO2 emis-
sions per
capita (log)
CO2 emissions in metric
tonnes per capita, logged
140 15.23 0.90 12.00 16.11 WDI
GDP per
capita (log)
GDP per capita, PPP (con-
stant 2011 international $),
logged
140 10.38 0.36 9.63 11.46 WDI
Population
(log)
Total population, logged 140 15.88 1.40 12.92 18.23 WDI
SD standard deviation, EU MM EU monitoring mechanism, WDI World Bank World Development Indica-
tors, GDP gross domestic product, PPP purchasing power parity
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Table 2 Determinants of the number of reported climate policies with reduction projections
(1) (2) (3)
Number of climate policies (all) 0.012***
(0.003)
0.012***
(0.003)
0.013***
(0.004)
Policy evaluation experience 0.275**
(0.112)
0.262**
(0.111)
0.288*
(0.164)
Monitoring Mechanism Regulation –0.766***
(0.163)
–0.806***
(0.172)
–0.923***
(0.231)
Reporting trend 0.169***
(0.051)
0.163***
(0.057)
0.208***
(0.066)
Government expenditure –0.046
(0.035)
–0.056
(0.035)
–0.049
(0.045)
Political constraints – 0.876
(1.063)
0.643
(0.841)
Green seats – –0.017
(0.021)
–0.048
(0.035)
Climate concern – –0.044
(0.137)
–0.014
(0.125)
CO2 emissions per capita (log) – – –0.075
(0.072)
Gross domestic product per capita (log) – – 0.646
(0.403)
Population (log) – – –0.057
(0.106)
Constant 2.863***
(0.770)
3.046*
(1.587)
–1.967
(4.800)
Observations 135 135 135
Countries 28 28 28
Alpha 0.742 0.731 0.690
AIC 1091.04 1095.36 1094.71
Negative binomial regression models. Country-clustered standard errors are in parentheses
***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1
AIC Akaike information criterion
a certain level of institutional path dependency in policy monitoring. In other words,
countries that were ahead 10 years ago remain, by and large, ahead today.
Third, the policy monitoring “trend” variable shows a strongly significant positive
association with the dependent variable, hinting at the presence of a learning effect in
policy monitoring over time (for further qualitative evidence, see Sect. 4.2). Based on
model 3, with every biennial reporting cycle, the number of quantifications increases
by around 23% (all other factors held constant). This is natural, as countries that
initiate quantification are likely to replicate the approach across policy domains in
order to achieve coherent policy monitoring and reporting.
Fourth, the model demonstrates that the introduction of the MMR in 2013 (in
effect for the reporting rounds of 2015 and 2017) decreased the expected number
of quantified projections by around 60%. In fact, that institutional shift seems to be
associated with a reduction both in the total number of reported policies and in the
share of policies with quantified projections (Fig. 2). Because we control for the
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total number of instruments, we interpret this finding as an adjustment effect related
to the aforementioned explicit possibilities for reporting “bundles” of policies and
their emissions reductions in the MMR. All other variables, including government
expenditure, political constraints, green seats, climate concern, CO2 emissions, GDP,
and population returned nonsignificant results. The online Appendix features several
robustness checks such as inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, a government’s
environmental policy position, and country fixed effects (see Table 5). These changes
do not affect our main findings.
Our second exploratory analysis models determinants of punctual reporting (Ta-
ble 3). The results should be interpreted with caution, given very limited extant
knowledge of the determinants of timely reporting. We observe that prior experience
with policy evaluation and monitoring, as well as higher levels of government expen-
diture, are positively and significantly associated with punctual reporting compared
to less experience and lower expenditures. The latter effect, even though statistically
significant only at the 10% level, is quite substantial, with a 1% increase in gov-
ernment expenditure being associated with a 26% increase in the odds of punctual
reporting. Furthermore, there is a marginally significant effect in model 1, indicat-
ing that the introduction of the MMR led to an almost 80% decrease in the odds of
punctual reporting. Slower reporting may, at least in part, originate from adjusting
to the new policy monitoring system (similar to the arguments on this independent
variable above). All the other variables yielded nonsignificant results (see model 3
in Table 3).
4.2 Qualitative Analysis
We interviewed four staff members of the EEA in order to better understand the
policy monitoring patterns from the perspectives of institutional settings, imple-
mentation, and quality. This section presents our findings. The main institutional
change at the EU level was the 2013 shift from basing the monitoring mechanism
on a decision (“Monitoring Mechanism Decision” [MMD]) to basing it on a regu-
lation (“Monitoring Mechanisms Regulation” [MMR]). Although EEA staff report
that the choice of legal act was not a main driver of change,7 the new rules do affect
the nature of the data. As one EEA staff member put it, “[w]e see the clear improve-
ment in the 2017 reporting in comparison to 2015 reporting cycle. Both quantity
and quality of the reported information improved.”8 In line with this statement, our
quantitative analyses also suggest that an immediate impact of the introduction of
the MMR was a decline in quantitative and timely reporting in 2015, but then im-
provements appeared to materialise in 2017 (see Sect. 4.1). We do not have data on
institutional changes in the member states, except that the shift from a decision to
a regulation removed potential ambiguities in reporting obligations introduced by
national laws.
As regards implementation, the Commission opted to implement the monitoring
mechanism via a regulation rather than a directive in order to ensure it was applied
7 EEA staff member 3, interview 11 January 2019.
8 EEA staff member 4, interview 11 January 2019.
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Table 3 Determinants of punctual submission of policy monitoring reports
(1) (2) (3)
Number of climate policies (all) –0.011
(0.009)
–0.012
(0.009)
–0.008
(0.009)
Number of climate policies with reduction
projections
–0.004
(0.011)
–0.003
(0.011)
–0.006
(0.012)
Policy evaluation experience 0.710**
(0.343)
0.705**
(0.355)
0.863**
(0.438)
Monitoring Mechanism Regulation –1.528*
(0.857)
–1.342
(1.099)
–1.354
(1.096)
Reporting trend 0.482
(0.331)
0.352
(0.448)
0.372
(0.455)
Government expenditure 0.224*
(0.131)
0.226*
(0.125)
0.232*
(0.127)
Political constraints – –0.486
(3.186)
–0.810
(3.243)
Green seats – –0.026
(0.059)
–0.029
(0.085)
Climate concern – –0.508
(0.552)
–0.460
(0.544)
CO2 emissions per capita (log) – –0.018
(0.272)
–0.017
(0.273)
Gross domestic product per capita (log) – – –0.063
(0.991)
Population (log) – – –0.146
(0.220)
Constant –4.572*
(2.595)
0.110
(5.375)
2.428
(14.033)
Observations 115 115 115
Countries 28 28 28
AIC 144.36 150.11 153.64
Logit regression models. Country-clustered standard errors are in parentheses
N= 115; for the remaining countries/cases, the exact submission time could not be determined (see Table 4
in the Appendix on-line)
***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1
AIC Akaike information criterion
throughout the EU as consistently as possible. In theory, the Commission oversees
implementation. In practice, there is no precise technical definition of what counts
as a “policy” that a member state is expected to report (see Footnote 1 above).
Member states can thus make discretionary choices in reporting. One EEA staff
member noted the concerted efforts by the EEA to assist the member states in
reporting, for example through the provision of webinars, workshops, and other
technical assistance. The new regulation has also strengthened the coupling (or
a compliance cycle) between the effort sharing and the greenhouse gas reporting,
where a member state’s progress is checked against the targets each year.9 European
Environment Agency staff members stated that the monitoring system “functions
9 EEA staff member 3, interview 11 January 2019.
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well” and highlighted that its implementation has helped them to detect (increasing)
member state difficulties in reaching the 2020 targets.10 However, progress checking
is done against national aggregate greenhouse gas statistics, and not against the
disaggregated policy-based specific data on which this article centres.
Finally, the EEA staff identified four key drivers of policy monitoring quality:
First, they discussed what demotivates member states. One of the challenges is that
“the concrete impact and use of this information, as well as the actual benefits of such
reporting, might not always be very explicit from member states’ perspective.”11 So
the EEA has attempted to explain the benefits (to them) of climate policy monitoring
and reporting, while also conceding that managerial logics around complying with
existing guidelines and legislation also continue to play an important role.12 The
second factor concerns the political willingness to engage in policy monitoring.
Ex post reporting may be unattractive (see also Schoenefeld and Jordan 2019, p. 370)
because, as one EEA staff member put it,
[...] politicians are not always very interested in ex post evaluation results, be-
cause this is just about looking at the past and might possibly identify certain
failures. Policy makers prefer focusing on future measures and demonstrating
that their plans will succeed, for example in reaching their country’s target.13
The third factor affecting policy monitoring quality concerns the willing-
ness and ability to mobilise resources for policy monitoring exercises. In some
states—especially in times of austerity—policy monitoring may simply not be a key
priority, and it may be subject to budget cuts.14 Fourth, the availability of commonly
agreed methodologies affects policy monitoring quality in the EEA’s view. “À la
carte” standards and methods, as Schoenefeld and Jordan (2017) have put it, are
generally unable to generate consistent data; the EEA staff members stressed the
existence of considerable methodological guidance, albeit accessing and using these
documents can sometimes challenge the member states.15
4.3 The Links Between Institutions, Implementation, and Quality
Our quantitative analyses and qualitative findings reveal that institutional settings,
implementation, and quality are closely interlinked. This becomes especially appar-
ent in the recent EU efforts to bring together its climate and energy policy in the
so-called Energy Union (see Knodt 2019).16 The regulation on the governance of
the Energy Union and climate action (2018/1999) that entered into force in De-
cember 2018 integrates two policy areas whose monitoring efforts had developed
rather separately at the European level: climate change and environment have been
10 EEA staff member 3, interview 11 January 2019.
11 EEA staff member 3, interview 11 January 2019.
12 EEA staff member 1, interview 11 December 2018.
13 EEA staff member 3, interview 11 January 2019.
14 EEA staff member 3, interview 11 January 2019.
15 EEA staff member 3, interview 11 January 2019.
16 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union.
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the competence of the Commission Directorate-General (DG) Climate Action and
DG Environment, whereas energy policy has been the competence of DG Energy.
As one EEA staff explained, “The Energy Union [...] integrates different pillars or
dimensions that had been considered a bit separately until now.”17 Another EEA
staff member vividly described the challenges of integrating monitoring activities
across the two policy areas:
They’d [DG Energy] be organised by the oil sector, the nuclear sector, [...] the
renewables sector, and they didn’t really talk to each other and [...] the different
parts of the energy industry would have different inroads into DG Energy. But
actually get[ting] them to start reporting on outcomes, or environmental out-
comes or climate outcomes, is something that [...] has been a big change for
them.18
These sentiments were echoed by another EEA staff member, who explained
that “the idea to them [DG Energy] that a small agency in Copenhagen which has
environment in its name would start messing around in the high politics of energy
was just not OK for them.”19 The person went on to say that “it’s unbelievable how
much time and effort is being spent on just having our agency working together with
a DG.”20 Furthermore, the EEA staff member emphasised that understandings of re-
porting differed significantly in the energy and the climate sectors: while reporting
in the energy sector is often industry specific and sometimes based on data from
existing sources, climate policy reporting is based on official country-based data that
go through quality assurance procedures. Another EEA staff member also stressed
the special nature of data emerging from the MMR, because “when data is officially
reported to us, it has a different meaning.”21 Directorate-General Energy has, accord-
ing to the EEA staff, had a different reporting approach, sometimes using consultants
in order to harvest existing data.22 EEA staff described the institutional integration
currently underway in the context of the Energy Union as “intensely political,” with
“some terrible fights between ministries at national level.”23 For example,
One of the kind of observed discussions was around what would happen to the
Climate Change Committee in the Energy Union governance proposal where
the Commission proposal was to have one committee at EU level, and the coun-
tries wanted to pick it apart again and say, no [...] we need an energy committee
and we need a climate change committee.24
17 EEA staff member 3, interview 11 January 2019.
18 EEA staff member 1, interview 11 December 2018.
19 EEA staff member 2, interview 17 December 2018.
20 EEA staff member 2, interview 17 December 2018.
21 EEA staff member 1, interview 11 December 2018.
22 EEA staff member 1, interview 11 December 2018.
23 EEA staff member 1, interview 11 December 2018.
24 EEA staff member 1, interview 11 December 2018.
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Asked about the potential integration of the Policies and Measures Database
with other databases, such as MURE on energy efficiency,25 one EEA staff member
highlighted the “big institutional challenge in integrating these different reporting
streams.”26 In sum, institutional integration of policy monitoring across policy sectors
and databases can generate significant obstacles, at least in the short term.
There are also key questions around who actively governs policy monitoring in
the future (see Schoenefeld and Jordan 2017). One EEA staff member stressed the
important role of public institutions in policy monitoring:
I think that in the next 5 years [...] this whole monitoring and data part of our
work will go through a very rapid evolution, and I think if public institutions
are not at the forefront of that for public purpose, it will be private institutions
who take over part of the job based on free data, and they will then start to sell
the information to others [...] also in the public sphere.27
Taken together, our interviews illuminate the relevance of institutional settings,
implementation, and quality for policy monitoring. These factors also affect the use
of policy monitoring data in evaluations, where quality is highly multidimensional
(Widmer 2012, p. 263). The significance of the factors is especially clear when
institutions are modified through changes in legislation, such as in the case of the
Energy Union.
5 Conclusions and Future Directions for Research and Policy
This paper started from the premise that while policy monitoring is often viewed
as a key ingredient to achieve greater policy success, its existence and functioning
should not be taken for granted. Our empirical results reveal that while climate
policy monitoring is routinely advocated across the EU, it is performed in a highly
differentiated manner. The fact that the European Commission does not provide
clear technical definitions of what a climate “policy” and a “measure” are, likely
contributes to some of this heterogeneity. The EU member states typically draw
on different models, generating dissimilar quantitative ex ante estimates of policy
effects. A part of the observed trends emerges from path dependency in policy
monitoring practice, as well as from the relatively decentralised approach to imple-
mentation (i.e., data collection at the national level). These institutional variations
in turn lead to significant differences in policy monitoring quality. The quality dif-
ferences show up in the data reported to the EEA, which in turn struggles to provide
25 The MURE (Mesures d’Utilisation Rationnelle de l’Energie) database provides information on energy-
efficiency policies and measures that have been carried out in the member states of the EU. http://www.
measures-odyssee-mure.eu/. It has been developed as a separate project that is coordinated by ADEME and
co-funded by EU research and development funding, but it is not officially linked to the EU Commission’s
activities.
26 EEA staff member 3, interview 11 January 2019.
27 EEA staff member 2, interview 17 December 2018.
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a cumulative climate policy database that would allow reliable comparisons across
member states.
Actors are nonetheless learning how to monitor climate policy over time. But any
improvements have emerged slowly, as climate policy monitoring is only to a minor
degree a question of making the member states report in a standardised form. The
main challenges emerge in the underlying process of shaping institutions and imple-
mentation, which, to be standardised, would require the standardisation of concepts,
detailed methods and, ultimately, even standardised policy making and politics.
Achieving such a high level of standardisation is highly unlikely (and potentially
normatively undesirable) because, as Weiss famously argued, policy monitoring and
evaluation activities typically “emerge [...] from the rough and tumble of political
support, opposition, and bargaining” (Weiss 1993, p. 94–95). A more realistic ob-
jective may be to explore what modifications are needed to strengthen the nascent
learning effects that are appearing across countries and in specific sectors.
Our initial exploratory analyses have clearly revealed the challenges of using
available climate policy monitoring data. The current quantitative ex ante data can-
not be used on their own to evaluate climate policies across the EU, and causal
effects are therefore difficult to examine. For instance, summing quantitative pre-
dictions of policy impact and putting these in relation with the individual, national-
level greenhouse gas reduction targets proved a futile exercise. Countries frequently
use different models and different counterfactuals when producing projections for
individual climate policies, generating serious risks of double-counting and inconsis-
tent findings. We could not usefully analyse the quantified, policy-based projections
across countries and sectors with regular statistical modelling, which raises con-
cerns about the usefulness of quantitative, per-policy projected emission reductions
for European-level climate policy making. The actual ex post assessment of policy
effort could not even be attempted because the data are so scarce that meaningful
statistical analysis proves impossible.
Policy monitoring is every bit as political as other aspects of governing. The
politics of policy monitoring encompass the institutional settings, implementation
dynamics, and ongoing debates about the (varying levels of) quality. The existence
of monitoring is therefore not a binary affair (i.e., present or absent), and it is
certainly not self-implementing. The impact of the institutional arrangements, the
implementation, and the quality of policy monitoring are political because they affect
the potential uses of policy monitoring data and, in consequence, the outcomes of
policy making.
A potentially useful venue for future research would be to consider ways of
exploring the data produced by the mandatory policy monitoring, for example by
analysing the sectors where policy instruments are applied (such as agriculture, en-
ergy, and transport) and the type of instruments that have been used (e.g., were they
regulatory, economic, or information-based?). Doing so would usefully extend the
work begun by Hildén et al. (2014), who have unpacked which types of instruments
are projected to generate the greatest emission reductions (based on the 2011 report-
ing data). Additionally, an exploration of the precise indicator mix used for policy
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monitoring could shed new light on the EU’s conceptualisation of climate policy.28
It would also be useful to explore the link between reported ex post emissions and
the ex ante projections. For example, are countries that overemitted in the past more
likely to overproject in the future? The ex post outputs from the mandatory policy
monitoring will have to improve significantly before such analyses can be conducted.
Finally, it would be fruitful to explore potential determinants of policy monitoring
institutions, implementation, and quality (as well as potentially their interactions in
statistical terms) in other policy areas in order to test the generalisability of our
findings.
Our results have a number of policy implications. The policy monitoring data we
analysed are highly heterogeneous and therefore useful only to a very limited extent
for broader analyses that seek to evaluate policy impact (especially because they are
by and large ex ante). This state of affairs bears relevance for the emerging Energy
Union and the Paris Agreement, both of which contain considerable policy monitor-
ing provisions. Current EU policy-based data systems say little about the EU-wide
climate policy effectiveness beyond emissions trading. The European Commission
should in the first instance engage in a co-creation process with the member states to
define and operationalise what “climate policies and measures” actually are in order
to improve their evaluability (see also Dahler-Larsen and Sundby 2019). Further-
more, the learning effects regarding the implementation of policy monitoring that we
detected provide some cause for optimism. If such improvements continue, perhaps
in the future countries may be able to produce more consistent data. Supporting
them should thus be a key priority. It may be necessary to provide further guidance
or even stricter legally binding requirements on climate policy monitoring, as the
current à la carte approach to quantified estimates of policy impact (see Schoenefeld
and Jordan 2017) appears to have largely failed to produce sufficiently consistent
data. The current usability of the policy monitoring data (e.g., for evaluation) thus
remains limited.
The ambition of climate policy monitoring in the EU is to deliver data that can
be used to judge the policies deployed in the member states and to evaluate their
effectiveness. In practice, the limited current potential uses of these data include the
following:
1. The ability to provide an overview of the kind of climate policies that member
states employ;
2. The ability to trace policy effectiveness over time within individual member states
based on the quantitative information;
3. Indicative insights on policy development for the Commission.
Beyond such uses, the data cannot, without substantial additional research effort,
be mobilised for comparative policy evaluations of specific policies across member
states in order to arrive at conclusions on the overall effectiveness of EU climate
policies. With this in mind, evidence on the de facto utilisation of the policies
and measures data in EU-level policy development remains patchy at best. Policy
monitoring use is a significant area of future research because it may also shed
28 We owe this idea to one of our reviewers.
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further light on the interaction between policy monitoring and development at the
member state and EU levels. In sum, the EU is still struggling to develop its own
climate policy monitoring system and resolve associated political challenges. Other
countries with less experience and lower capabilities may therefore face even greater
challenges in the context of global climate governance.
Climate monitoring in the EU has so far mostly focused on the relatively strin-
gent reporting of national greenhouse gas emissions according to IPCC guidelines
(Eggleston et al. 2006). By contrast, the climate policy monitoring approach at the
centre of this analysis appears a second-order priority compared to assessing na-
tional-level greenhouse gas emissions (low priority has also been demonstrated in
other areas of monitoring and evaluating environmental policies; see Potluka 2019).
One way to address this may be to strengthen the link between the national green-
house gas inventories with the reporting on climate policies and measures. Doing so
may also help address the glaring imbalance between ex ante and ex post reporting
on policies (see Schoenefeld et al. 2018). In this way, policy-based data may be-
come a helpful ingredient in explanations of changes in national-level greenhouse
gas emissions and thus contribute to growing efforts at decomposition analyses,
which seek to explain patterns of national-level emissions (e.g., Kisielewicz et al.
2016). Our results point to the fact that investing more resources into producing
comparable results and incentivising learning among the member states is crucial
for the future development of new policies in Europe and, ultimately, the mitigation
of climate change.
After more than 25 years of development, climate policy monitoring in the EU
remains a work in progress. Similar analyses of other policy areas (Radaelli 2003;
Tholoniat 2010) have stimulated demands for policy monitoring to be combined with
sanctioning mechanisms, such as in the European Semester (Verdun and Zeitlin
2018) and in the emerging Energy Union (Energy Systems of the Future 2019;
[EU]2018/1999). There are, however, no guarantees that raising the political stakes
on policy monitoring with sanctioning will quickly and easily address the fundamen-
tal institutional, implementation, and quality issues that we have identified. Doing
so could even be counterproductive if it discourages candid reporting.
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